Studi Ekonomi dan Kebijakan Publik (SEKP)
ISSN: 2963-394X, Vol 5, No 1, 2026, 77-91 https://doi.org/10.35912/sekp.v5i1.7380

Education, Political, and Economic Systems in Corruption Prevention in Indonesia: A Systemic Integrity Framework

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Article History
Received on 27 May 2026
1st Revision on 7 June 2026
2nd Revision on 16 June 2026
3rd Revision on 17 July 2026
Accepted on 18 July 2026

Abstract

Purpose: This conceptual study examines how the education system, the political power system, and the economic system jointly shape the institutional conditions for corruption prevention in Indonesia, and proposes a systemic integrity framework linking these three domains.

Research Methodology: The study employs a conceptual qualitative design based on an integrative literature review and institutional analysis of corruption theory, political-finance and vote-buying research, anti-corruption education literature, and constitutional and ethical-economic sources; no primary data, sample, or statistical test is involved.

Results: The analysis indicates that corruption prevention weakens when education produces technical competence without corresponding ethical internalization, when political authority can be disproportionately acquired through financial resources, and when economic success is measured predominantly through material accumulation without accountability for its sources.

Conclusions: Sustainable corruption prevention in Indonesia depends less on the absence of normative foundations, since higher-education law and the 1945 Constitution already embed integrity, morality, and economic democracy, and more on the persistent gap between these formal mandates and their institutional implementation.

Limitations: As a conceptual synthesis, the framework has not been empirically tested, and its constructs and propositions require future quantitative validation.

Contributions: The study extends corruption research by repositioning education, political finance, and economic governance as upstream, interacting determinants of a national integrity ecosystem rather than isolated causes of individual wrongdoing, and offers policymakers and educators an integrative reference for designing preventive, rather than purely punitive, anti-corruption strategies.

Keywords: *Anti-Corruption Education, Economic Democracy, Institutional Integrity, Political Accountability*

How to Cite: Wibisono, C., Syukur, I. B., Lestari, R. A. W. D., Wahyuni, E. S., & Mursal. (2026). Education, Political, and Economic Systems in Corruption Prevention in Indonesia: A Systemic Integrity Framework. *Studi Ekonomi dan Kebijakan Publik*, 5(1), 77-91.

1. Introduction

Corruption is conventionally analyzed as an individual failure. A public official accepts a bribe, an administrator manipulates a procurement process, a political actor abuses delegated authority, or an executive diverts institutional assets for private benefit, and each act plainly involves individual moral responsibility (Cressey, 1953; Mitchell et al., 2020). Such acts rarely remain isolated once tolerated: corrupt practices tend to become normalized within organizations through repeated rationalization and socialization of newcomers into existing informal norms, so that individual acts of corruption and the organizational cultures that sustain them are mutually reinforcing rather than independent (Ratanabanangkoon & Kantabutra, 2025). Yet an exclusive focus on individual wrongdoing overlooks the institutional environment in which that wrongdoing occurs. Individuals are educated within a specific educational system, compete for authority within a specific political system, and pursue welfare and status within a specific economic system, so their conduct cannot be fully understood in institutional isolation (Thompson, 2018). Framing corruption solely as a question of individual ethics therefore risks treating a systemic problem as though it were merely a series of unrelated personal failures. A more fundamental question that this study poses is not simply why individuals become corrupt, but what kinds of institutional systems produce, tolerate, discourage, or prevent corrupt behavior, and this study proceeds from the proposition that sustainable corruption prevention requires analysis conducted at that systemic level (Martinsson, 2021), a conclusion also reached by international development institutions that increasingly treat governance effectiveness and transparency as preconditions for, rather than mere by-products of, effective corruption control (Chen & Neshkova, 2020), and by sector-specific evidence showing that transparency and accountability mechanisms materially determine whether large-scale public and donor-funded programs resist corruption capture (Chang et al., 2021).

Three systems are treated here as particularly strategic because of the structural functions they perform. The education system is central because it forms the future political, economic, bureaucratic, professional, academic, judicial, and business elite, and because the ethical orientation instilled during education shapes how later-acquired technical competence is subsequently used (Hauser, 2019a). The political power system is central because political processes determine who holds legitimate authority over legislation, budgets, appointments, public policy, and the allocation of state resources, so the manner in which that authority is acquired conditions the incentives attached to its later use (Thompson, 2018). The economic system is central because economic structures shape the distribution of resources, social perceptions of success, the relationship between capital and political power, and the incentives surrounding wealth accumulation (Rose-Ackerman & Palifka, 2016). When these three systems reinforce integrity, corruption becomes structurally more difficult to sustain; when they instead generate conflicting incentives, anti-corruption institutions face a substantially more difficult task regardless of how vigorously they are enforced.

This argument is informed by the *Model Integratif Pencegahan Korupsi Berbasis Akhlak Mulia* (MIPKAM), an integrative framework, still under development and not yet empirically validated, which conceptualizes sustainable corruption prevention as requiring the simultaneous cultivation of human integrity, accountable institutional systems, and a supportive social environment (Wibisono, 2026). The underlying MIPKAM manuscript proposes a national strategy that begins with character formation through families and education, continues through good governance and institutional control, and culminates in an integrity-supporting national culture. The present study extends this reasoning from the level of individual intention toward the macro-systemic structure within which corruption prevention actually operates, treating MIPKAM as a conceptual lens for synthesis rather than as an established, empirically tested theory.

The Indonesian education system illustrates a paradox that motivates this study's first system-level concern. Universities train engineers, economists, accountants, physicians, lawyers, bureaucrats, and managers, and in doing so strengthen intellectual capacity; yet intellectual capacity is ethically neutral, since the same competence that allows an accountant to design transparent financial reporting equally allows that competence to be applied toward sophisticated financial manipulation (Hapsari & Chariri, 2024). Intelligence is accordingly not equivalent to integrity, and higher education must therefore be understood as needing to cultivate both professional competence and moral-professional integrity together, rather than assuming that the former will automatically produce the latter. It is important, however, to state Indonesia's educational problem accurately rather than rhetorically. Indonesia's Law No. 12 of 2012 on Higher Education does not define higher education as a value-free science-and-technology enterprise; the legislation explicitly links higher education to faith, piety, noble character, humanities, and the advancement of science and technology (Republic of Indonesia, 2012). The more defensible criticism is therefore not that Indonesia legally maintains a science-only education system, but that an implementation gap persists between this normative educational mandate and the systematic integration of moral integrity into day-to-day professional learning and institutional practice, a gap Indonesia's Corruption Eradication Commission (*Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi,* KPK) has itself begun to address by promoting anti-corruption competence as a continuous element of character education from early schooling through higher education (Hauser, 2019b).

A second paradox concerns political power. Democratic competition rests on the principle of political equality, expressed in the norm of one citizen holding one vote, yet this equality can be distorted when economic resources become disproportionately influential in determining access to political office, a phenomenon this study terms the monetization of political competition. Legitimate campaign financing is not itself problematic; the corruption risk instead emerges when political competition becomes transactional, through vote buying, illicit campaign financing, patron-client exchanges, or the trading of political appointments and regulatory favors for financial support. Recent Indonesian research indicates that vote buying remains a persistent electoral-integrity concern: studies of the 2024 general election identify continuing evidentiary and institutional difficulties in enforcing prohibitions against vote buying (Pratama & Kusmantoro, 2025; Djuyandi et al., 2025), while more localized evidence from the 2024 simultaneous regional elections finds that money politics persists through social networks, patron-client relationships, and permissive local norms rather than through poverty alone (Romadhan, 2025). Comparative research reinforces this pattern: under-institutionalized party systems have been shown to impede electoral accountability for corruption across a broad comparative sample of democracies (Schleiter & Voznaya, 2018), and formal modeling work demonstrates that vote buying can generate self-reinforcing corruption cycles once political institutions are sufficiently weak (Accinelli et al., 2020). When a cycle of financial investment, political access, acquired authority, and control over public decisions becomes established, public office risks losing its meaning as amanah, an entrusted responsibility to serve society, and instead becomes treated as an investment from which political expenditure must be recovered.

A third paradox concerns the economic system. The term capitalism carries multiple theoretical and institutional meanings, and market economies differ substantially in their regulatory systems, welfare structures, taxation, competition policy, and social protections, so corruption should not be attributed simplistically to capitalism as such; many market economies maintain comparatively strong corruption controls, while corruption also occurs under non-capitalist arrangements (Rose-Ackerman & Palifka, 2016). The more analytically relevant question concerns whether a given economic structure concentrates economic power excessively, allows that power to capture political decision-making, normalizes rent-seeking, or separates wealth creation from moral and public accountability. In the Indonesian constitutional context, an exclusively individualistic, laissez-faire economic model would misrepresent the normative framework in force, since Article 33 of the 1945 Constitution explicitly establishes the economy as a common endeavor based on the family principle, directs that natural resources be used for the greatest prosperity of the people, and mandates that the national economy be organized according to economic democracy incorporating togetherness, equitable efficiency, sustainability, and balanced national progress (Republic of Indonesia, 1945). Indonesia's constitutional foundation therefore already articulates economic democracy, collective prosperity, and social responsibility as normative commitments; the relevant empirical and institutional question is not whether capitalism should be replaced, but the extent to which actual economic incentives and institutions realize these constitutional commitments in practice, a formulation that opens space for dialogue among Pancasila economics, the people's economy, cooperative economics, and Islamic economics (Roziq et al., 2022).

Read together, these three paradoxes point toward a shared structural diagnosis rather than three unrelated problems. The Indonesian case is best characterized not as an absence of normative foundations for integrity, competence-with-ethics, or economic justice, since such foundations already exist in higher-education law and constitutional economic principles, but as an implementation and institutional-incentive gap between those formal mandates and their systematic realization in educational practice, political competition, and economic governance. This study accordingly develops a systemic integrity framework that connects the education system, the political power system, and the economic system as upstream, interacting determinants of corruption prevention, and organizes the remainder of the article as follows: Section 2 develops the theoretical foundation and formal propositions; Section 3 details the conceptual review methodology; Section 4 presents the integrated systemic model and its results as a conceptual synthesis; and Section 5 concludes with limitations and directions for future empirical research.

2. Literature Review and Hypotheses Development

2.1 Corruption as a Systemic Phenomenon

Corruption research has historically examined different levels of analysis without fully integrating them. Agency theory frames corruption as a conflict between principals and agents arising from information asymmetry and misaligned incentives (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). The fraud triangle explains individual-level rationalization by emphasizing the joint presence of pressure, opportunity, and rationalization (Cressey, 1953). A distinct strand reframes the unit of analysis away from the individual wrongdoer altogether, arguing that certain corrupt patterns take root because they quietly serve a function within an otherwise legitimate institution, so that a workable reform strategy must identify and replace that function rather than simply pursue the individuals involved, whose personal motives may be entirely beside the point, a dynamic documented at the operational level by ethnographic evidence showing how middle managers can translate legitimate upper-management performance targets into corrupted, lower-level routines that subordinates are pressured to enact (Thompson, 2018). Collective-action approaches explain why corruption can persist even where individuals privately disapprove of it, because each actor rationally expects corruption to remain widespread among others and calibrates behavior accordingly, so that conventional principal-agent anti-corruption interventions, such as raising the expected cost of detection for a single corrupt official, become substantially less effective once corruption has taken on this collective-action character; Martinsson (2021) extends this debate by arguing that anti-corruption strategy should move beyond the principal-agent-versus-collective-action dichotomy altogether toward a policy-centered approach that evaluates each intervention against the specific mechanisms it is meant to disrupt. The MIPKAM framework draws on this insight by integrating three dimensions, namely human integrity, system integrity, and environmental integrity, and by arguing that corruption prevention cannot be achieved through a single institution or policy instrument but instead requires the combined development of scientific and professional capacity, moral commitment, institutional governance, and a supportive social environment. The present study extends this reasoning by developing three national systems, education, political power, and economics, as the specific institutional channels through which that combined development can be analyzed.

2.2 Education System and Corruption Prevention

Education can influence corruption prevention through several interlocking mechanisms. It builds cognitive capacity by developing knowledge of law, governance, economics, and professional responsibility; it develops ethical reasoning by strengthening the capacity to recognize ethical dilemmas and weigh the consequences of decisions; it contributes to character formation by reinforcing honesty, responsibility, discipline, and trustworthiness; it performs professional socialization by introducing future practitioners to the standards governing their occupations; and it shapes institutional culture, since students observe directly whether their own universities practice transparency, fairness, and academic integrity. These mechanisms together explain why anti-corruption education cannot be reduced to a single lecture on the legal definition of corruption, since a student may know precisely what corruption means in law while remaining morally unprepared to resist it in practice (Hapsari & Chariri, 2024). Beyond its role in individual character formation, unequal access to education is itself a documented consequence of corruption, since corrupt allocation of educational resources and opportunities has been shown to entrench socioeconomic inequality in adult access to education, indicating that the relationship between education and corruption runs in both directions rather than only from education toward corruption prevention (Gerganov et al., 2021). This concern is consistent with international evidence: a systematic review of anti-corruption education in higher-education institutions finds that most existing interventions concentrate on legal awareness while devoting comparatively little attention to sustained character and integrity formation (Mohammed et al., 2026), and case-based evidence from Indonesian civic-education courses indicates that project-based, participatory anti-corruption instruction produces stronger character outcomes than lecture-based legal instruction alone (Dewantara et al., 2021). Indonesia's KPK has itself moved toward this broader conception, explicitly defining anti-corruption education as the sustained strengthening of character and integrity culture rather than the one-time transmission of legal information, and promoting the integration of anti-corruption competence into both curricula and institutional culture (Hauser, 2019b).

The distinction between competence and integrity can be summarized concisely: competence answers whether a person is capable of performing an action, while integrity determines whether that capability is used responsibly. Corruption-preventive education should accordingly cultivate several complementary dimensions of capability at once, including intellectual intelligence for understanding technical problems, emotional intelligence for regulating interpersonal conduct, spiritual-moral intelligence for developing ethical orientation and accountability, professional competence for executing responsibilities effectively, and ethical competence for applying knowledge responsibly once acquired. The reform this implies is not a reduction in scientific or technical training, since Indonesia continues to require stronger capacity in engineering, technology, medicine, economics, and management, but rather the deliberate integration of integrity alongside that technical capacity, so that a modern anti-corruption university produces graduates who are simultaneously professionally excellent and morally accountable. This logic is also consistent with evidence that religious and character education strengthens corruption-related integrity outcomes only when it is substantively connected to professional practice rather than confined to separate, isolated coursework (Hasan, 2016); it is on this basis that the present study formulates its first proposition:

> *P_1:* An integrity-oriented education system, one that integrates ethical reasoning, character formation, and professional socialization alongside technical competence, contributes positively to corruption prevention in Indonesia

2.3 Political Power System and Corruption Prevention

Political institutions govern access to some of the state's most consequential resources, including budgeting, legislation, public appointments, taxation, licensing, procurement, natural-resource governance, and regulatory enforcement, so the manner in which political power is obtained strongly conditions the incentives surrounding its subsequent use. Where gaining political office requires extremely high personal expenditure combined with informal financial obligations, an elected official may face structural incentives to recover political costs, reward donors, sustain political networks, or facilitate favored business interests once in office. This does not imply that every candidate who incurs high campaign costs becomes corrupt; it implies instead that high-cost, opaque political competition creates structural corruption risk, independent of any single candidate's personal intentions. The central anti-corruption question this raises is whether a political system can ensure that authority is earned primarily through public trust, competence, and legitimate democratic support rather than transactional financial capacity. Indonesian evidence on the 2024 general election documents persistent evidentiary and institutional difficulties in enforcing existing prohibitions against vote buying (Pratama & Kusmantoro, 2025; Djuyandi et al., 2025), while research on the concurrent 2024 regional elections finds multiple forms of money politics, including direct vote buying and material distribution, embedded within patron-client and social networks rather than confined to isolated transactions (Romadhan, 2025). This body of evidence motivates the study's second proposition:

P_2: A transparent and accountable political power system, in which financial resources cannot be readily converted into political access or public-policy privilege, contributes positively to corruption prevention in Indonesia

The underlying construct this proposition operationalizes can be termed financial dominance in political access, referring to the extent to which financial resources disproportionately determine nomination, campaign competitiveness, political networking, voter mobilization, and access to decision-makers; its structural counterpart is integrity-based political access, characterized by transparent political financing, enforceable expenditure rules, public disclosure, merit-based recruitment, internal party democracy, and effective sanctions against vote buying. Framing the problem in these terms is analytically more useful than asserting broadly that politics is controlled by money, because financial dominance and integrity-based access can each, in principle, be measured, compared across political systems, and ultimately tested empirically, a point developed further in the methodology and conclusion of this study.

2.4 Economic System and Corruption Prevention

Economics influences corruption through both structural and cultural mechanisms. Structurally, excessive economic concentration can allow a limited number of actors to exercise disproportionate influence over regulation, licensing, procurement, or political financing, creating conditions conducive to state capture, regulatory capture, rent-seeking, and conflicts of interest. Culturally, economic values shape how a society defines success; when social prestige becomes overwhelmingly attached to material wealth without corresponding concern for the legitimacy of its sources, individuals may experience stronger incentives to accumulate wealth regardless of the means employed, a pattern consistent with discourse-analytic evidence that Indonesian business-government relations often normalize corrupt exchange by framing it in terms of cultural obligation and collective identity rather than individual wrongdoing (Pertiwi, 2022). The MIPKAM framework identifies excessive consumerism, hedonistic social pressure, and the overvaluation of material wealth as integrity risks of this kind, while advocating a cultural orientation that instead values productivity, innovation, responsibility, and ethical entrepreneurship. The relevant distinction is not between wealth and its absence, entrepreneurship and its absence, or profit and its absence, but between wealth obtained with ethical accountability and wealth obtained without it, between entrepreneurship and rent extraction secured through political privilege, and between profit earned through legitimate value creation and profit obtained through corruption, exploitation, or collusion. This reasoning motivates the study's third proposition:

P_3: A justice-oriented and accountable economic system, one in which economic incentives are aligned with social responsibility and public welfare rather than unaccountable accumulation, contributes positively to corruption prevention in Indonesia

Finally, because the education, political, and economic systems examined above are theorized to operate jointly rather than in isolation, sharing overlapping institutional channels through which integrity, accountability, and accumulation incentives interact, the study advances a fourth, integrative proposition that captures their combined structural influence

P_4: The education, political power, and economic systems jointly and interactively shape the institutional conditions for corruption prevention in Indonesia, such that their combined configuration explains corruption-prevention outcomes more fully than any single system considered in isolation. As formulated within a conceptual, non-empirical study, P4 identifies a testable interaction to be examined in future quantitative research rather than a relationship already demonstrated by the present analysis

2.5 People-Centered Economics, Economic Democracy, and Islamic Economics

Indonesia's constitutional framework does not require a binary choice between unlimited market capitalism and complete state control. Article 33 of the 1945 Constitution requires that economic governance serve collective prosperity and economic democracy, creating institutional space for a plural economic architecture that includes private enterprise, cooperatives, state-owned enterprises, micro, small, and medium enterprises, community and social enterprises, Islamic finance, and ethical investment operating within a shared framework of justice and accountability (Republic of Indonesia, 1945). A people-centered economic system within this architecture emphasizes broad participation in economic development through productive inclusion, cooperative development, and fair access to capital and regional economic opportunity; cooperatives in particular remain constitutionally salient because Article 33 emphasizes collective economic endeavor grounded in the family principle, and contemporary Indonesian parliamentary discussion continues to treat cooperative reform as strategically connected to equitable national welfare.

Islamic economics offers a complementary ethical framework for strengthening corruption prevention within this plural architecture, grounded in principles such as *amanah* (trustworthiness), *'adl* (justice), the requirement that transactions and their sources be *halal* (legitimate), the explicit prohibition of *risywah* (bribery), zakat as a mechanism of redistribution and social responsibility, and maslahah as a standard of public benefit against which economic activity can be evaluated (Roziq et al., 2022). These maqasid-based objectives of Islamic law have been shown to extend coherently into economic policy design more broadly, providing a normative basis for aligning market regulation, resource allocation, and public accountability with justice rather than accumulation alone (Karimullah, 2023). Islamic economics does not prohibit entrepreneurship, private property, markets, or profit; its distinctive contribution lies in situating each of these within an explicit moral structure, so that profit remains legitimate but the method of obtaining it matters, wealth remains legitimate but carries social responsibility, and markets remain useful but must operate within a framework of justice. Consequently, Islamic economics can complement constitutional economic democracy by reinforcing its ethical foundation rather than substituting for it, an integration that is consistent with recent scholarship applying maqasid al-shariah, the higher objectives of Islamic law, directly to anti-corruption governance and public financial accountability (Roziq et al., 2022).

2.6 Literature Search and Selection Strategy

To make the review process as transparent and replicable as an integrative, non-systematic design permits, literature was identified through structured searches of Scopus, Google Scholar, and the Directory of Open Access Journals (DOAJ), using combinations of the search terms corruption, systemic corruption, institutional theory, anti-corruption education, political finance, vote buying, economic democracy, Islamic economics, and Indonesia. The search was restricted, with limited exceptions for foundational theoretical sources, to publications from 2016 to 2026, reflecting the study's aim of grounding the framework in contemporary evidence while retaining a small number of classical works whose theoretical status justifies their inclusion regardless of publication date. Sources were included if they addressed corruption or anti-corruption mechanisms at an institutional or systemic level within education, political finance, or economic governance, and were published in a peer-reviewed journal, university press monograph, or official government or KPK institutional document; sources were excluded if they addressed corruption solely as an isolated individual-level or firm-level phenomenon without institutional or systemic framing, or if their relevance to the three focal systems, education, political power, and economics, could not be established. Four bodies of literature were integrated through this process: corruption and institutional-governance theory; political-finance and vote-buying research; educational-integrity and anti-corruption education literature; and constitutional, people's-economy, and Islamic-economic literature. Sources retrieved through this process were synthesized narratively around the three focal systems, following the thematic-synthesis logic common to integrative reviews in institutional and governance research, with MIPKAM applied as the overarching integrative lens connecting the three thematic strands.

3. Research Methodology

3.1 Research Design

This study employs a conceptual qualitative research design based on an integrative literature review and institutional analysis, consistent with prior conceptual work on institutional corruption and ethical governance (Thompson, 2018; Roziq et al., 2022). The objective is to develop a theoretical model that synthesizes existing evidence across otherwise separate literatures, rather than to test statistical causality or report empirical findings from primary data; no sample, survey instrument, or hypothesis test is employed, and the propositions developed in Section 2 are accordingly framed as conceptual claims to be examined by future empirical research rather than as findings already established by this study.

3.2 Research Constructs and Operationalization

Table 1 summarizes the three independent constructs and the dependent construct this framework proposes, together with an illustrative set of measurable indicators for each. These indicators are proposed as a starting point for future instrument development and empirical testing; they are not measured or tested within the present conceptual study.

Table 1. Constructs and illustrative indicators for future empirical testing

Construct	Illustrative Indicators / Proxies	Proposed Level of Analysis
X_1 - Integrity-Oriented Education System	Curriculum integration of professional ethics; anti-corruption course coverage; academic-integrity policy enforcement; graduate integrity-outcome assessment	Institution (university); individual graduate cohort
X_2 - Accountable Political Power System	Campaign-finance disclosure compliance; ratio of reported to estimated campaign spending; vote-buying prosecution rate; internal party democracy index	Political party; electoral district; candidate
X_3 - Justice-Oriented Economic System	Share of productive credit reaching cooperatives/MSMEs; ownership concentration ratio; state-business conflict-of-interest disclosures; ethical/Islamic finance penetration	Sector; region; firm
Y - Corruption Prevention	Corruption Perceptions Index trend; whistleblower-report volume and follow-through; procurement irregularity rate; public-institution integrity survey score	National; sub-national; institution

As shown in Table 1, each construct is deliberately specified with indicators drawn from institutional records, disclosure data, or survey instruments already used elsewhere in corruption and governance research, so that the propositions developed in Section 2 can be operationalized without requiring the invention of entirely new measurement instruments. This operationalization is intended to establish a direct bridge between the present conceptual framework and the quantitative research agenda outlined in Section 5.3, rather than to substitute for that future empirical work.

4. Results and Discussions

Because this study is conceptual rather than empirical, the material presented in this section constitutes a theoretical synthesis of the literature reviewed in Section 2, organized around an integrated systemic model, rather than a report of statistically tested findings. The section first presents the integrated model connecting the three focal systems, then discusses each system's role in turn, and closes by evaluating the framework's novelty and boundary conditions against existing literature, as requested in the review of this manuscript.

4.1 An Integrated Systemic Model of Corruption Prevention

The conceptual model developed in this study treats the integrity-oriented education system, the accountable political power system, and the justice-oriented economic system as three interacting upstream determinants of corruption prevention, consistent with Propositions 1 through 4 in Section 2. The education system is theorized to operate primarily by building human integrity, the political power system by constraining how authority is acquired and used, and the economic system by shaping the incentives and accountability attached to material accumulation; corruption prevention is conceptualized as the joint, interactive outcome of these three channels rather than as the simple sum of three independent effects, an important qualification given that P4 specifically proposes an interactive rather than additive relationship. This joint conceptualization can also be read through

MIPKAM's own vocabulary, in which education chiefly builds intention and character, political structures chiefly determine opportunity, and economic structures chiefly shape environmental incentives, so that the three systems examined here correspond to MIPKAM's intention, opportunity, and environment dimensions applied at the macro-institutional rather than individual level. This connection illustrates one respect in which the present framework extends MIPKAM from the level of individual intention toward a national-systemic architecture, while leaving the empirical strength of that extension to be established by future quantitative work rather than asserted here as a demonstrated finding.

4.2 Education: From Technical Competence to Integral Competence

The most consequential educational outcome for corruption prevention may not be factual knowledge about what corruption legally constitutes, but the capacity to decline participation in it when direct pressure to do so arises, whether through bribery, manipulated reporting, procurement collusion, or academic dishonesty. That capacity depends on character formation rather than on cognitive knowledge alone, so education aimed at corruption prevention must teach not only how a person can succeed, but how success should be pursued ethically; a technically capable but ethically unprepared graduate can, on this reasoning, pose a greater institutional risk than a less capable one, because greater competence extends the capacity to manipulate systems undetected. A specific concern raised in Indonesian higher education is the potential separation between religious or ethics coursework and professional training, such that students may come to regard religious commitment as confined to worship while treating professional life as a purely technical domain; the corrective this study proposes is the deliberate integration of ethical and religious reasoning into professional curricula themselves, so that, for example, accounting instruction connects integrity to honest financial reporting, engineering instruction connects it to public-safety responsibility, and legal instruction connects it to the pursuit of justice, rather than confining ethical content to separate, isolated courses (Hasan, 2016).

This claim is not without boundary conditions. Character-based educational interventions are unlikely to counteract corruption risk on their own where an organization's incentive structure rewards or requires corrupt behavior for survival or advancement, a limitation acknowledged in the anti-corruption education literature itself, which notes that classroom-based integrity formation shows weaker effects in institutional environments where corrupt practice is normalized among senior colleagues and superiors (Mohammed et al., 2026). Ethics-integrated education should accordingly be read as a necessary but not sufficient condition for corruption prevention, one whose effectiveness is itself conditioned by the political and economic systems examined in the remainder of this section, rather than as a self-sufficient solution capable of operating independently of them.

4.3 Political Power: From the Power of Money to the Power of Integrity

Political competition necessarily requires financing for campaign organization, communication, and voter outreach, and the existence of campaign costs is not itself a corruption risk. The risk instead emerges through what this study terms political investment recovery risk: high, opaque political expenditure followed by electoral victory can generate structural pressure on the newly acquired authority to recover costs or reward financial and political networks, creating conditions conducive to the misuse of public authority even where no single official acted with corrupt intent at the outset. Framed this way, the concern is a risk mechanism rather than an accusation against any elected official, and it becomes amenable to empirical testing through the indicators proposed in Table 1, including campaign-finance disclosure compliance and the ratio of reported to estimated campaign spending. Persistent evidence of vote buying in Indonesia's 2024 elections indicates that this pathway remains empirically salient rather than a purely theoretical concern (Pratama & Kusmantoro, 2025; Romadhan, 2025). The corresponding reform trajectory this study proposes is a shift from political competition organized around the power of money toward competition organized around ideas, performance records, and public trust, achieved through strengthened campaign-finance transparency, anti-vote-buying enforcement, donor disclosure, and conflict-of-interest regulation; the objective of such reform is not to eliminate money from politics, which would be unrealistic in any democratic system, but to prevent money from purchasing political decisions once office has been secured.

A relevant counter-argument, drawn from comparative political-finance research, is that formal disclosure and expenditure regulation alone do not reliably reduce transactional politics where party systems remain weakly institutionalized, since weak institutionalization undermines voters' capacity to attribute responsibility and sanction corrupt incumbents even when financial information is technically available (Schleiter & Voznaya, 2018). This suggests that the political-system reforms proposed here are contingent on a minimum threshold of party-system institutionalization, and are unlikely to be sufficient in electoral contexts where that threshold is not met, a boundary condition the present framework did not originally specify and that future empirical work applying the indicators in Table 1 should test directly.

4.4 Financial Transparency and Institutional Accountability as a Recurring Governance Theme

The premise that financial transparency and disclosure function as institutional-accountability mechanisms is not specific to political finance; a parallel and substantial body of Indonesian research examines transparency and accountability directly within public and corporate financial governance, reinforcing the plausibility of the mechanisms proposed above. Studies of Indonesian local-government financial performance find that fiscal independence, dependence on central transfers, and capital-expenditure allocation are each significantly associated with the quality and accountability of regional financial reporting, with financial-report quality itself moderating how these structural conditions translate into institutional performance (Rahmadhanty & Firmansyah, 2025). Related evidence from regional government revenue centers finds that the structure and consistency of local financial administration meaningfully shape realized financial performance (Anisman, 2021), while comparative analysis of district and municipal government financial statements shows performance outcomes vary considerably even under a shared national regulatory framework, underscoring that formal accountability rules alone do not guarantee uniform institutional integrity (Anasta & Ambarwati, 2023). Complementary evidence on internal control effectiveness finds that financial-statement transparency is strengthened when internal control mechanisms are paired with accountable, ethically oriented leadership rather than treated as a purely technical compliance function (Putra & Aziza, 2025), and corporate-governance research on financial-distress risk similarly finds that board composition and ownership diversity, both structural accountability variables, significantly shape financial-integrity outcomes (Sa'diyah et al., 2025). Even in capital-market settings distinct from public-sector governance, disclosure-related financial policies have been shown to influence market perceptions of firm reliability, indicating that transparency functions as a valued signal of institutional accountability across both public and private financial contexts (Khasanah et al., 2025). Taken together, this literature indicates that the accountability mechanisms this study proposes for political and economic governance are consistent with, rather than isolated from, a broader and well-established Indonesian research tradition linking financial transparency to institutional integrity.

4.5 Economics: Redefining Success and Operationalizing Economic Democracy

Economic systems shape social aspirations by defining what counts as achievement; where success is measured predominantly through wealth, luxury, and status, ethical restraint can become socially costly, whereas a more integrity-oriented conception of success emphasizes productivity, legitimate prosperity, and social contribution alongside material reward. On this view, wealth, entrepreneurship, and profit are not themselves problematic; the relevant questions concern how wealth was obtained, whether tax and labor obligations were fulfilled, and whether public resources or political influence were exploited unlawfully in the process. This reasoning connects directly to the constitutional economic-democracy principle discussed in Section 2.5: when economic opportunity is broadly distributed rather than concentrated, more citizens can achieve economic independence without relying on political patronage, which correspondingly reduces the structural attractiveness of rent-seeking and lowers the extent to which individual prosperity depends on proximity to political power. Economic democracy can accordingly be read not merely as an economic-policy objective but as a structural anti-corruption instrument in its own right. Islamic economics contributes a complementary spiritual-ethical dimension to this same objective, situating markets, entrepreneurship, and profit within an explicit moral structure grounded in amanah, justice, and social accountability, rather than rejecting markets or private property outright (Roziq et al., 2022); because corruption frequently occurs at the intersection of money and power, ethical economics is theorized here to constrain money's capacity to purchase power, just as accountable politics is theorized to constrain power's capacity to sell public policy.

This economic argument likewise carries a boundary condition worth stating explicitly. Economic-democracy instruments such as cooperative development and MSME credit access can themselves become vehicles for elite capture or clientelist distribution where they are administered without independent oversight, a risk documented in broader clientelism research showing that resource-distribution programs intended to broaden economic participation can instead reinforce existing patron-client networks if governance safeguards are weak (Berenschot & Aspinall, 2020). The economic-system proposition developed in this study therefore presupposes a baseline level of administrative accountability in how economic-democracy instruments are implemented, a precondition the framework treats as necessary rather than automatic.

4.6 Theoretical Novelty and Boundary Conditions

The novelty claimed by this framework does not rest on the assertion that education, politics, economics, and corruption have never previously been studied together; institutional and systemic-corruption theory has long recognized that these domains interact (Thompson, 2018; Martinsson, 2021; Rose-Ackerman & Palifka, 2016). What existing systemic-corruption and institutional-theory literature has not, to this study's knowledge, done is to connect these three specific systems as joint upstream determinants of a national integrity ecosystem within a single Indonesian framework that is explicitly positioned prior to, rather than as a substitute for, downstream law-enforcement and prosecutorial anti-corruption functions. Most anti-corruption intervention research and institutional design, both in Indonesia and internationally, concentrates on downstream mechanisms: corruption occurs, investigation begins, evidence is gathered, and sanctions follow. These downstream functions remain indispensable, and this study does not propose replacing them. The present framework instead asks what happens upstream of that sequence, before a person becomes a public official, before a politician gains control of a budget, and before economic and political power become entangled, and organizes the answer around the three systems examined in Sections 2 and 4. This upstream orientation, and the specific joint operationalization proposed in Table 1, constitute the framework's principal claim to novelty, a claim whose ultimate empirical strength depends on the future quantitative testing outlined in Section 5.3 rather than on the conceptual synthesis presented here alone.

Taken together with the boundary conditions identified in Sections 4.2 through 4.4, the framework's central claim can be stated as follows: a nation is unlikely to sustain effective corruption prevention if its educational system does not systematically cultivate integrity, if its political system permits excessive monetization of political access, and if its economic system rewards accumulation without commensurate ethical and public accountability, but each of these three levers is itself conditioned by institutional prerequisites, adequate organizational incentive alignment for education, a minimum threshold of party-system institutionalization for political reform, and baseline administrative accountability for economic-democracy instruments, that determine whether the lever functions as theorized. Identifying these boundary conditions is intended to make the framework more precise and more testable, not to weaken its central claim.

5. Conclusions

5.1 Conclusion

This conceptual study set out to examine how the education system, the political power system, and the economic system jointly shape the institutional conditions for corruption prevention in Indonesia. Synthesizing corruption theory, political-finance and vote-buying research, anti-corruption education literature, and constitutional and ethical-economic sources, the study finds that corruption prevention weakens when education produces technical competence without corresponding ethical internalization, when political authority can be disproportionately acquired through financial resources rather than public trust, and when economic success is measured predominantly through material accumulation without accountability for its sources. Indonesia's case is best characterized not as an absence of normative foundations, since higher-education law and the 1945 Constitution already embed integrity, morality, and economic democracy as formal commitments, but as a persistent implementation and institutional-incentive gap between those formal mandates and their systematic realization in educational practice, political competition, and economic governance. The systemic integrity framework developed here, formalized through Propositions 1 through 4 and operationalized through the illustrative indicators in Table 1, repositions education, political finance, and economic governance as interacting upstream determinants of a national integrity ecosystem, complementing rather than replacing the downstream law-enforcement functions on which anti-corruption strategy has conventionally relied.

5.2 Research Limitations

As a conceptual synthesis rather than an empirical study, this framework has not been tested against primary data, and its four propositions, including the interactive claim advanced in P4, accordingly remain theoretical claims pending future quantitative validation rather than established findings. The review strategy described in Section 3.2, while more transparent than a purely narrative review, does not meet the full documentation standard of a formal systematic review or meta-analysis, since it does not report a complete count of articles screened and excluded at each stage. The indicators proposed in Table 1 are illustrative rather than validated measurement instruments, and their reliability and construct validity would need to be established through pilot testing before use in empirical research. Finally, the framework's constitutional and legal discussion is confined to Indonesia's Higher Education Law and Article 33 of the 1945 Constitution, and its generalizability to other legal and constitutional systems, particularly those without comparable constitutional economic-democracy provisions, has not been assessed and should not be assumed.

5.3 Suggestions and Directions for Future Research

Future research should prioritize the empirical testing of the four propositions developed in this study, formalized as corresponding hypotheses: that an integrity-oriented education system positively affects corruption prevention (P_1); that an accountable political power system positively affects corruption prevention (P_2); that a justice-oriented economic system positively affects corruption prevention (P_3); and that the three systems jointly and interactively affect corruption-prevention outcomes (P_4). Testing could proceed through structural equation modeling using partial least squares, potentially incorporating an integrity-culture construct as a mediating mechanism between the three systemic predictors and corruption-prevention outcomes, drawing on the illustrative indicators proposed in Table 1 and sampling across civil servants, academics, political-party officials, business actors, auditors, and civil-society representatives to capture variation across the sectors the framework addresses. Future work should further refine and validate measurement instruments for each construct, extend the comparative analysis to other emerging democracies with differing constitutional economic provisions to test the framework's generalizability beyond Indonesia, and examine the boundary conditions identified in Section 4, particularly the roles of party-system institutionalization and administrative oversight of economic-democracy instruments, as moderating conditions rather than as fixed background assumptions. Pursued in this sequence, the framework developed here is intended to function as a preliminary theoretical map for that empirical agenda rather than as its conclusion.

Acknowledgement
The authors gratefully acknowledge Universitas Batam for its institutional support during the preparation of this manuscript. The authors also thank the anonymous reviewers and journal editors for their constructive comments, which substantially improved the conceptual clarity, structure, and academic rigor of this article. This research received no specific grant from any funding agency in the public, commercial, or not-for-profit sectors.

Author Contributions
CW contributed to conceptualization, development of the systemic integrity framework, and drafting of the original manuscript. IBS contributed to the literature review and synthesis of political-finance and vote-buying evidence. RAWDL contributed to the literature review and synthesis of anti-corruption education evidence. ESW contributed to the literature review and synthesis of economic-democracy and Islamic-economics evidence. M contributed to manuscript review, editing, and critical revision of the final version. All authors read and approved the final manuscript.

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